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Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of  
Europe’s Regional Liberalization Agreements 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After a short background on recent developments in gravity modelling and liberalization 
agreements in Europe, this paper measures the trade creation and diversion effects of major 
European agreements based on the results of a correctly specified triple-indexed gravity 
model with bilateral fixed effects. For each agreement and partner country, welfare 
implications are discussed in sectors of different factor intensities with emphasis on the role 
of similarity in income or relative factor endowments between partners, as well as the date 
and the reciprocity of the agreement. This is followed by a description of the characteristics 
of the non-partner countries that are affected by these agreements in each sector.      
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1.  Introduction 
 
Europe certainly has the most elaborate network of liberalization agreements among all 
regions of the world. These agreements are with a variety of different countries and they differ in 
the degree of integration intensity and the reciprocity of the liberalization process. This paper 
analyzes the trade creation and diversion effects of major regional liberalization agreements in 
Europe based on a modified triple-indexed gravity model. The agreements considered are the 
European Economic Area, the European Community’s customs union, the agreements of 
European Free Trade Area countries, and those of the European Union countries, in particular, 
the Europe Agreements with Central and East European countries, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements and the earlier Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements, as well as the Central 
European Free Trade Area. 
Among others, Baldwin (1994), Feenstra (1998), Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) have shown 
that one of the most successful ways to formulize international trade flows is through gravity-
type models. These models have been frequently used to measure the impact of regional trade 
agreements. Although since Viner (1950) it is known that the impact of any trade agreement is a 
combination of trade creation and diversion effects, gravity modellers rarely tried to decompose 
these effects (Greenaway and Milner, 2002). Some unsuccessfully tried to use dummy variables 
for members of trade blocs and for non-members, with the expectation of negative coefficients 
for the latter. However, this technique has been separately criticised by Polak (1996) and Matyas 
(1997) because of direct use of bloc dummy variables in the gravity equation, which, they 
conclude, leads to incorrect inferences. In fact, Matyas (1997) showed that such gravity models 
used for this purpose were actually mis-specified from the econometric point of view due to 
presence of unnecessary constraints put on the parameters of the model.  They suggested a model 
with country fixed effects, which are to be analyzed to find the impact of liberalization 
agreements.  
Taking these criticisms into account, this paper develops a methodology that captures trade 
creation and diversion effects using the parameters of a correctly-specified gravity model. The 
model is built on the triple-indexed gravity model, a fixed effects model with separate constants   3
for the year, the importer and the exporter countries. This model is augmented by time-invariant 
bilateral interaction fixed effects, as well as some other factors that explain bilateral trade flows, 
except liberalization agreements. An analysis of error terms for member country importer and 
exporter pairs against those of a member country importer from non-member countries is carried 
out over time to capture trade creation and diversion effects of liberalization agreements.  
The results show that majority of the liberalization agreements have been welfare improving 
for all partners involved in all sectors, especially in human and physical capital-intensive sectors. 
The exceptions are the Europe Agreements, and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, where the 
EU partners experienced welfare losses especially in resource- and labor-intensive sectors. While 
welfare gains are observed in EU’s partners in the Europe Agreements across all sectors, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements failed to create trade.  
Largest diversions occurred from non-partner countries with similar income levels to partner 
countries, and also from former colonies, developing countries, and European countries that did 
not take part in these agreements, such as Norway and Switzerland.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: After discussing the recent econometric 
developments in gravity modelling, a correctly specified fixed effects gravity model is proposed 
in Section 2 to decompose trade creation and diversion effects. A short background about the 
regional trade agreements in Europe precedes the application of the model to the trade of 
European countries in Section 3. Trade creation and diversion effects of agreements on different 
factor intensity sectors in partner countries are discussed along with an analysis of diversion 
from non-partner countries in Section 4.  
 
2.  Background and the approach 
 
There are two broad options for governments seeking to liberalize trade: Unilateral and 
preferential liberalization. Both of these options lead to welfare improving trade creation: The 
removal of trade barriers leads to elimination of domestic sourcing by firms and consumers in 
some industries in favor of imports more efficiently produced in partner countries. However, 
Viner (1950) established that in contrast to unilateral liberalization, preferential liberalization 
give rise to both trade creation and diversion. In such agreements, since partner countries are 
favored, the possibility arises for trade diversion: The removal of trade barriers for partner   4
countries may lead firms and consumers to source from less efficient suppliers located in a 
partner country rather than from the least-cost non-partner source of supply. 
Although gravity models have been very frequently used in modelling international trade 
flows, they have not yet been successfully used in capturing the above-mentioned trade creation 
and diversion effects of liberalization agreements, despite the changes made since its 
development by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963). In its simplest form, the volume of 
bilateral trade between two countries is explained by the size of their economy, and the 
geographical distance between their economic centers. Trade-promoting variables that capture 
different aspects of bilateral relations often find their way into gravity models. Common border, 
common language, past colonial relations and measures of cultural proximity can be counted as 
the most frequently considered additions.  
Furthermore, the basic model has also been augmented by monetary variables such as the 
real exchange rate (Bergstrand, 1985; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995), and measures of 
exchange rate uncertainty as suggested by Thursby and Thursby (1987) such as foreign currency 
reserves (Matyas, 1997). Variables coming from competing trade theories are also often added to 
the model. Measures of relative factor endowments as suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, 
and measures of similarity as suggested by the Increasing Returns Theory can be found in 
gravity models of Balassa (1986), Helpman (1987), and Balassa and Bauwens (1987).  
Typically, bloc dummy variables were used in these models to test the significance of 
preferential agreements on trade volumes. Positive and significant coefficients for these bloc 
variables are interpreted as trade promoting effects of the agreements among partners in 
comparison to third countries. Raising econometric issues, Polak (1996) criticizes such use of 
bloc dummy variables directly in gravity models as the inferences they lead may be incorrect. 
Some other econometric problems about the specification in the gravity models have also 
been recently raised. Wang and Winters (1991) argued against averaging models’ variables over 
time since that would restrict the parameters of the model to be the same for every year. 
Similarly, Baldwin (1994) argued that using total trade as the dependent variable imposes an 
unnecessary constraint of equal coefficients for imports and exports. Matyas (1997) took this 
idea further to suggest that a correctly specified model should have separate constants not only 
for each year but also for each exporter and importer, proposing the triple-indexed gravity model.   5
Lastly, Egger (2000), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) removed another restriction by adding 
bilateral interaction fixed effects. 
Taking all of these criticisms into account, the methodology used in this paper to capture 
trade creation and diversion effects is based on analyzing the error terms of the following 
correctly specified fixed effects gravity model:  
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where ijt M is country i’s imports from country j at time t. λt, αi, γj, and δij are the year, the 
importer and exporter country, and bilateral interaction fixed effects, respectively. Year fixed 
effects capture time-varying factors that influences volume of imports for all countries. Importer 
and exporter country fixed effects take into account time-invariant factors specific to the 
importer and exporter countries. Lastly, bilateral interaction fixed effects bring in the time-
invariant influences for a country pair. Unlike Egger (2000) or Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), a 
distinction is made here between the importer and exporter in the computation of bilateral fixed 
effects, since this allows for analysis of non-reciprocal trade agreements such as the 
Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements. 
 Furthermore,  dij stands for distance importer country i and exporter country j.
1 GDPs of 
importer and exporter countries, Yit and Yjt, their per capita GDPs, yit and yjt, as well as the real 
exchange rate  ijt e ∆  and their foreign currency reserves, Rit and Rjt are some of the other variables 
in the model.  
  Two variables in the model come from the competing trade theories: Similarity in economic 
sizes, SIMijt, and relative factor endowments, RFijt. These are computed as follows:  
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captures the similarity in size of countries i and j at time t in terms of their GDP. When the two 
countries are of equal size, the term inside the parentheses takes the value of 0.5, and decreases 
as countries diverge in size.  
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measures the distance between the partner countries in terms of their relative factor endowments. 
Kit and Lit denote the capital stock and the labor force for country i at time t, respectively. When 
countries i and j have the same factor endowment ratios, this measure takes the value of zero, 
and increases as the difference widens. Capital stocks needed for the above measure is obtained 
using the perpetual inventory method: 
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where GFCFit is the gross fixed capital formation in country i at time t.  Note that capital stocks 
are assumed to depreciate at a constant rate of 10%.   
Some bilateral factors that are typically used in the literature are also controlled. These are 
CBij, CLij, and COLij, which capture the effects of common border, common language and past 
colonial relations, respectively. With the presence of these bilateral variables in the model, the 
error terms, ijt φ , are more refined, and can thus be interpreted as the time-variant bilateral effect 
on country i’s imports from j at time t,  not taken into account elsewhere. In particular, the 
effects of liberalization agreements will predominantly be reflected on these error terms. 
Consequently, this gravity equation is used to benchmark normal levels of imports. The 
deviations from the normal captured by these time-varying bilateral error terms are analyzed 
over time to measure trade creation and diversion effects.  
This model is regressed separately for imports from industries grouped based on the factor 
intensity of production (Wolfmayr-Schnitzer, 1998). The resulting five sectors are as follows: 
Resource-intensive industries (Sector 1), labor-intensive industries (Sector 2), human capital-
intensive low technology industries (Sector 3), human capital-and labor-intensive high 
technology industries (Sector 4), and human and physical capital-intensive high technology 
industries (Sector 5). The list of SITC-2 codes of industries in each sector is given in Appendix 
A. Since 2002 was the last year with complete data set for all variables, the time period covered   7
is 1962-2002. The analysis covers 42 partner countries’ manufacturing trade with each other, and 
with 129 non-partner countries.  
As one can see from the regression results given in Table 1, the parameters assumed the 
correct signs and are significant with the exception of relative factor endowment differences, 
RFijt.
2 Accordingly, imports of a country from another decrease with geographical distance 
between them, and increase with GDP and per capita GDP of both partners. Furthermore, 
increases in real exchange rate, measured by the price of foreign goods in terms of domestic 
good decreases imports, and stability of exchange rates, measured by foreign currency reserves, 
increases imports. However, note that the real exchange rate becomes an insignificant factor for 
all three human capital-intensive sectors. The usual trade-promoting impacts of common border, 
common language and colonial links are also observed. The unexpected negative sign for the 
difference in relative factor endowments can be explained by dominance intra-industry imports 
in Europe’s imports. The majority of European trade is with other rich countries with similar 
factor endowments, making the Increasing Returns Theory more relevant for Europe’s trade.  
In the next section, the analysis of error terms of these regressions is carried out, after 
computing the year, importer and exporter country, and bilateral interaction fixed effects, which 
are not reported in Table 1. 
 
3.   Europe’s liberalization agreements 
 
Regional integration efforts in Europe started with formation of two blocs, the European 
Economic Community (now called the EU) in 1957, and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
in 1960. European Economic Community provided a more intense integration than EFTA. It not 
only encompassed the gradual elimination of import barriers on all trade between member 
nations, but also for instituted common external tariffs. 
In recent years, the EU engaged in a number of efforts to expand or deepen its trade 
relationships with neighboring countries. In fact, many consider granting trade preferences as the 
most effective foreign policy instrument of the EU (Brulhart and Matthews, 2003). These efforts 
took the form of the European Economic Area (EEA) with EFTA countries in 1994, the Europe 
Agreements (EA) with 10 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) in the first half of 
1990s. Some of the CEEC formed the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 1993.   8
Turkey entered into the European Community’s Customs Union (ECCU) in 1996. The 
cooperation agreements of mid-1970s were transformed to eventually create the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMA) in 2010 under Association Agreements with a number of 
Mediterranean countries in late 1990s or early 2000s. EEA, EMA, and Turkey’s accession to the 
ECCU can be considered in support of the suggestion of Lamy (2002) that the EU is now 
seeking to deepen rather than enlarge its regional trade agreements. The European Union also 
signed free trade agreements other than the EA and the EMA at various dates, which are grouped 
under the European Community’s –other– Free Trade Agreements (ECFTA). Similar agreements 
were also signed by EFTA with other countries of the region. List of the partner countries, the 
trade blocs, and the effective years of accession into these blocs are given in Table 2.   
There are a number of similarities among these agreements. All aim at dismantling of trade 
barriers in manufacturing sectors, but no such goal is claimed for the agriculture or services 
industries.
3 Furthermore, the liberalization process for all is asymmetric. In other words, the EU 
(or the EFTA) is scheduled to liberalize faster than their partners.  
Some important differences should also be mentioned: Tariff elimination in EMA is more 
gradual than EA. The liberalization process is spread over a period of 8 years in the EAs as 
opposed to 12 years in EMAs. The intensity of the agreements is also different. The early 
cooperation agreements were nothing more than non-reciprocal preferential market access 
arrangements, which opened up the European markets to the partners, but a reciprocal 
liberalization was not expected from the partners.
4 The Europe and the Mediterranean 
agreements aim on forming a free trade area, which involves reciprocal liberalization, although 
they are asymmetric in terms of liberalization process. The Customs Union agreement with 
Turkey is a result of reciprocal liberalization process dating back to 1963, which adopts common 
external tariffs. Lastly, the European Economic Area is the most intense form of liberalization, 
which also allows free movement of capital and labor.  
Differences exist not only in the agreements but also in the characteristics of the partners 
involved. First of all, the CEEC, EFTA countries and Turkey are regarded as prospective 
members of the EU.
5 In fact, these liberalization agreements ended with full membership for 
three former EFTA countries in 1995, and for all CEEC except Romania and Bulgaria in 2004.
6 
However, no such prospect exists of North African countries. To illustrate these differences, 
Table 3 gives the gross domestic product, per capita GDP, the capital-labor ratio of all countries   9
of the region, the GDP-weighted distance of their economic centers to EU capitals, as well as the 
average tariff rates on the years the agreements came into force and for most recent years, 
computed using import duties as percentage of imports. These differences will also be crucial in 
assessing the trade creation and diversion impacts of the liberalization agreements, and also in 
determining which non-partner countries are going to be adversely affected. 
With the exception of Luxembourg, all EU countries have big economies, with GDP’s larger 
than 100 billion US$. In this respect, EFTA countries are similar to EU countries, except for 
Iceland. Among CEEC, Poland is the only country comparable to the EU in terms of its size. 
This is also the case for Turkey, Israel, and Egypt to a lesser extent. The rest of the partners have 
significantly smaller economies. It is expected that liberalization agreements with bigger 
countries will have bigger impact, especially on smaller economies.  
Weighted distances to EU capitals are less than 1000 km for the core EU countries. In 
Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, this distance is in 1000s of km, and between 2000-3000 
km for Mediterranean partners. Liberalization with distant countries is expected to have smaller 
impact, since distance will present a non-tariff barrier to trade that can only be reduced with 
lower transport costs.  
In terms of per capita incomes, there is no difference between EU and EFTA countries.  The 
rest of the European partners’ incomes are less than half of the EU average, with notable 
exceptions of the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. The income levels in 
Mediterranean partners are much smaller except for Israel. There are also significant differences 
in capital-labor ratios of EU and EFTA members relative to other partners. The capital-labor 
ratio in CEEC is about 20% of that in the EU, ranging from 8% of the EU average in Latvia to 
43% of the average in Slovenia. This ratio is comparable to Southern EU members in Cyprus, 
Malta, and Israel. However, for the rest of Europe and the Mediterranean countries, there is a 
large gap with the EU members ranging from 6% to 15% of the EU average. Similarity in both 
income levels and capital-labor ratios will play an important role in determining which sectors 
will be most affected by a liberalization agreement between two countries, the magnitude of the 
impact, and from which non-partner countries trade will be diverted. Largest diversion is 
expected to be from countries with similar income or capital-labor ratios with the partner. The 
impact on human capital-intensive sectors is expected to be bigger in liberalizations with   10
countries similar to EU, whereas liberalizations with low income or low capital-labor ratio 
countries will have bigger impact on resource- and labor-intensive sectors.   
  Average tariff rates were almost non-existent in EU countries and less than 2% in EFTA 
countries at the time EEA was formed. The rate of tariff elimination in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Iceland and Switzerland are especially remarkable. The tariff rates in CEEC were relatively low 
at the time of the EA, and are now at less than 2%. In particular, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Romania and Bulgaria experienced the fastest liberalizations since the EA were signed. The 
average tariff rates dropped significantly in other Europe as well, as a result of the liberalization 
with the EU down to around 2% in late 1990s. They are relatively higher in the remaining 
European countries, and significantly higher in Mediterranean countries, 6% to 18%, with the 
exception of Israel. Bigger reductions in average tariff rates over shorter periods of time are 
expected to have much bigger trade creation and diversion effects. 
 
 
 
4.  Trade creation and diversion effects of Europe’s agreements 
 
To compute the trade creation and diversion effects in a way that allows comparisons, for 
each agreement and each one of its members, the bilateral error terms from the regression model 
are averaged separately before and after the agreement for each of their partners in liberalization 
and non-partners. The sum of changes with partners after liberalization produced a measure of 
trade creation, and the one with non-partners is used to measure trade diversion effects. These 
changes are scaled so that the resulting figure gives these changes relative to importer country’s 
GDP. Since 2002 was the last year covered in the analysis, countries that participated in an 
agreement after 2002 are considered non-partners.  
The resulting trade creation and diversion effects are given in Table 4 for the EEA. 
Accordingly, only in Southern EU countries of Spain, Portugal, Greece, and to a lesser extent in 
Italy, the EEA led to trade creation with partners in labor- and resource-intensive sectors. In 
these sectors, majority of partner countries experienced increases in imports from non-partners. 
Spain was the only country with increases in imports from partners in human capital intensive 
low technology, and human capital- and labor-intensive sectors. Overall, the human and physical   11
capital-intensive sector experienced the highest trade creation from the EEA. Interestingly, for 
the majority of the partners, the imports from non-partners also increased, implying that welfare-
reducing effects of trade diversion are not significant for this sector.   
Similar changes are observed in Table 5, where the effects of ECCU are given. In addition to 
changes observed in Southern EU countries in Sectors 1-4, and those observed in almost all EU 
countries in human and physical capital-intensive sectors, trade creation is also observed in 
Sectors 1-4 in the core EU countries
7, with no trade diversion effects from the non-partners. 
Sapir (1996) also finds that the increase in intra-EU trade was not at the expense of non-partners. 
For Turkey, trade creation is coupled with increases in imports from non-partners in all sectors. 
Hence, the welfare effects of ECCU on Turkey, the only non-EU member among the partners, 
seem positive across all sectors, with only slight trade diversion in human capital-intensive low 
technology sector. 
   Table 6 gives the effects of EFTA’s agreements. Countries are grouped into two groups: 
Original members, and their partners that made agreements with EFTA mostly in 1990s. EFTA’s 
agreements seem to be welfare improving for all of the original members in all sectors. Imports 
from partners have increased along with small but positive changes with non-partners. Only a 
few countries experienced decreases in their imports from partners in resource- and labor-
intensive sectors. The distant country of Iceland stands out in this group, which has seen its 
imports from both partners and non-partners decrease for most sectors. The situation in new 
partners of EFTA shows the effect of date of liberalization. The changes in imports from both 
partners and non-partners are mostly positive and are much bigger than the changes observed in 
most recent partners, which are mostly negative. It is also worth mentioning that EFTA’s 
agreements resulted in bigger magnitude changes in new partners than in the original members. 
This might be a combined result of income or capital-labor ratio and size differences between 
these two groups. 
Somewhat similar effects are observed as a result of the European Community’s agreements 
other than EA and EMA, given in Table 7. Especially for the core EU countries, welfare 
implications are positive with increases in imports from both partners and non-partners in all 
sectors. However, for other EU countries and for the new partners of the EU, there are some 
decreases in resource-intensive, labor-intensive, and human capital-intensive low technology 
sectors, more so with partners than with non-partners. Like in the case of EFTA’s agreements,   12
the effects on new partners of the EU are much bigger in magnitude. In most recent partners, 
there are decreases in imports from both partners and non-partners in all sectors. 
    Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the effects of Europe Agreements shown in 
Table 8. For an overwhelming majority of the EU members, Europe Agreements resulted in 
welfare losses in Sectors 1-4; imports from partners have increased while it suffered from 
decreases in imports from non-partners. Only the changes in the human and physical capital-
intensive high technology sector are welfare improving with increases in imports from both 
partners and non-partners for most EU members. In contrast, the CEEC partners experienced 
welfare gains in all sectors. Furthermore, the increases in imports from partners and non-partners 
are both more pronounced than those experienced by EU members. The most recent partner, 
Slovenia, constitutes the only exception, which experienced decreases in imports from both 
partners and non-partners in most sectors. Slovenia also stands out in the effects of CEFTA as 
well, given in Table 9. It is also the only country that experienced welfare loses from CEFTA, 
where increases in imports from partners were primarily a consequence of decreases of imports 
from non-partners. For other CEEC, the increases in imports from partners were accompanied by 
much larger increases with non-partners in all sectors, yielding welfare gains for them. 
The effects of early non-reciprocal cooperation agreements with Mediterranean countries and 
the Euro-Mediterranean agreements are given in Tables 10 and 11. Accordingly, the cooperation 
agreements have been welfare reducing for EU countries in the resource-intensive sectors, and 
welfare improving in human and physical capital intensive high technology sectors. While the 
same effects resulted from the EMA, the effect on Sectors 2-4 have been different for these 
agreements: Cooperation agreements yielded mixed results, but EMAs were welfare reducing for 
these sectors. The effects on Mediterranean partners’ imports show that both the cooperation 
agreements and the EMAs have been unsuccessful in trade creation. Imports of these countries 
from partners have been negatively affected, while imports from non-partners have somewhat 
increased with the exception of Sectors 3 and 4 where there are decreases. While this implies no 
welfare losses due to an overall insignificant trade diversion, lack of trade creation implies no 
welfare gains either. Non-reciprocality of the cooperation agreements is likely to be the reason 
for absence of increase in imports of Mediterranean countries from their EU partners. However, 
due its reciprocity, the result in EMAs can only be explained by their very recent enforcement.    13
Furthermore, large trade diversions were expected in Mediterranean countries’ imports as a 
result of EMAs (Hoekman and Djankov, 1996). Since the European countries had already 
opened their markets through the early cooperation agreements, the EMAs only opened up 
Mediterranean markets to European countries. Expected trade diversion in Mediterranean 
imports has so far occurred only in Sectors 3 and 4. Hoekman and Djankov (1996) give 
incentives to reforms, commitment to market economy rules, and enforcement mechanisms as 
possible reasons for why Mediterranean countries would agree to these clearly-welfare reducing 
EMAs.   
Other than the partner countries, the impact on non-partners is also worthwhile to examine. 
An interesting question to analyze is how similarity in income levels of non-partner countries 
with levels in partner countries plays a role in determining the degree of diversion from non-
partners in different factor intensity sectors. To analyze this, Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between per capita income levels in non-partners and trade diversion in these countries for each 
of the sectors as a result of all of the agreements considered in this paper. The degree of 
diversion reported here is with respect to non-partner exporter country’s GDP, rather than 
importer partner’s GDP that has previously been the case.  
First note that, in the figures there are some partner countries that have been analyzed earlier. 
This is because countries are considered non-partners in the agreements that they did not take 
part. For example, EFTA countries are non-partners in ECCU, EA, CEFTA, EMA, and MCA.  
Furthermore, even if not shown here, since the analysis is on non-partners, there is also 
considerable diversion effect on new partnerships on old partners. In fact, that is quite significant 
in EEA and ECCU, where income similarity is high between old and new partners.  
In Figure 1, first note that largest diversions have occurred in resource-intensive sector, and 
moderate diversions are observed in the labor-intensive sector. Trade diversions in all three 
human capital-intensive sectors have been less than 0.1% of the non-partners GDP, with the 
exception of couple countries in Sector 5.
8 While, there is clearly more diversion from poorer 
non-partners in resource-intensive sectors, diversion from richer countries is notable in human 
capital intensive sectors 3 and 4. In the labor-intensive sector, and to some degree in human 
capital and labor intensive sector, middle-income developing countries have experienced 
decreases in their exports to European countries as well. Overall, the diversion has occurred from 
former colonies of the UK, Netherlands and France, from other developing countries such as   14
Chile, Hong Kong, Korea, as well as some rich European non-partners, notably from Norway 
and Switzerland.    
It is also noteworthy that there is a general positive correlation with the magnitude of trade 
diversion and per capita income levels.  
Figure 2 gives similar plots separately for each agreement but aggregated over all sectors. 
Largest trade diversions occurred as a result of ECFTA, EA, and EMA, ignoring the diversion 
from the outlier non-partner country of Zambia. The average diversion due to these agreements 
is about 0.1% of the non-partner countries’ GDP. Note that these are the agreements where the 
similarity in income levels or relative factor endowments between the EU and its partners were 
the largest. The same is the case for EMA, but the lower than expected diversion due to EMA is 
likely a result of very recent dates of EMA. Moderate diversions have occurred as a result of 
EEA and ECCU where, income levels are similar among the partners. EFTA and especially 
CEFTA resulted in the smallest trade diversion, around 0.005% of non-partners’ GDP, possibly 
due to smaller scale of the agreements in terms of the number and size of the partners involved. 
As observed in Figure 1, the effects have been primarily on exports of former European colonies, 
developing countries, and Norway and Switzerland. It is also noteworthy that trade diversion due 
to EFTA impacted primarily the neighboring non-partner East European countries such as 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Kazakhstan. Similarly, nearby countries of Macedonia, 
Moldova, Belarus and Lithuania are impacted most by CEFTA.  
5.  Conclusion 
This paper developed a modified version of the triple-indexed gravity model with bilateral 
interaction fixed effects, and analyzed its time-varying bilateral error terms to measure trade 
creation and diversion effects of major European liberalization agreements.  
The majority of the agreements turn out to be welfare improving for the European and its 
partner countries in all factor intensity sectors. The exceptions are the liberalization agreements 
made with less similar partners such as the Europe Agreements with Central and East European 
countries, and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries, 
especially in resource- and labor-intensive sectors. While the EU’s partners in the Europe 
Agreements experienced welfare-improvements, the latter agreement was ineffective to improve 
the welfare of the EU’s partners because of its failure to create trade.    15
A few observations are worth stressing. The impact, either the trade creation or diversion is 
bigger on smaller partners. This is especially obvious in EEA, where the date of enforcement is 
the same, and the income or capital-labor ratios are similar among partners. Secondly, date of 
enforcement matters. The impact of an agreement is much smaller, and typically more welfare 
improving for old partners relative to larger and generally non-trade creating for newer partners. 
This can be observed when comparing the core EU members to countries that joined the EU in 
1995 in ECCU and ECFTA agreements, and when comparing the EU members to its partners in 
EA and EMAs. 
 Lastly, similarity in income or capital-labor ratios seem to be relevant in determining which 
partner countries will experience trade creation in which sectors, and which non-partners will be 
hurt by the trade diversion. Southern EU countries experienced the trade creation in resource- 
and labor-intensive sectors, whereas for the rest the impact on human and physical capital-
intensive sectors was most significant as a result of ECCU and EEA. Another example came 
from the Europe Agreements, where trade creation was most significant in the first two sectors 
for CEEC, and in the latter for the EU.  
Largest diversions occurred as a result of ECFTA, EA and MCA, where there are large 
differences in terms of income and capital-labor ratios between the EU countries and their 
partners. Furthermore, diversion typically occurred from non-partners from former colonies and 
developing countries, which are somewhat similar to EU’s partners in these agreements. This is 
reflected in significant positive correlation between income and measure of diversion.  
The diversion from Norway and Switzerland is noteworthy, given their similarity to the EU 
countries. These countries willingly excluded themselves from the EU. Although not conclusive, 
this finding raises the possibility of a domino effect of the EU’s agreements, and might force 
these countries to reconsider their decision or to liberalize their trade separately with the EU’s 
partners in these agreements. Similar expectations exist for former Soviet countries of Ukraine, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation given the effects of EFTA, and for Macedonia, 
Moldova, and Belarus given the effects of CEFTA. Using the gravity approach of this paper for 
these countries and agreements might provide further evidence for the domino effects theory by 
Greenaway (2000) and Sapir (2001). 
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TABLE 1. Regression results for each sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Sector 1: Resource-intensive, 2: Labor-intensive 3: Human capital-
intensive low technology, 4: Human capital- and labor-intensive high 
technology, 5: Human and physical capital-intensive high 
technology. 
Data source: UN Comtrade, World Development Indicators 2004, 
IMF International Financial Statistics, and CEPII.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ijt M   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ij d   -1.33 -1.24 -1.10 -1.10 -1.12 
  (-120) (-126) (-87.1)  (-92.3)  (-95.5)
it Y   0.32 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.31 
  (18.5) (25.6) (18.9) (19.2) (16.6)
jt Y   0.09 -0.09  0.23 0.15 0.06 
  (5.02) (-5.80)  (9.95) (6.82) (2.75) 
it y   0.47 0.58 0.74 0.83 0.59 
  (20.7) (29.9) (29.4) (34.8) (24.1) 
jt y   0.63 0.68 1.01 0.96 0.91 
  (24.7) (31.5) (32.6) (33.4) (29.1) 
ijt e ∆   -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
  (-2.44) (-2.50) (-1.13) (-1.69) (-0.99) 
it R   0.05 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.04 
  (8.47) (25.7) (7.16) (15.6) (6.91) 
jt R  0.08 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.08 
  (13.6) (27.9) (8.89) (21.9) (11.2) 
ijt SIM     0.17 0.01 -0.02  -0.01  0.06 
  (31.9) (1.19) (-2.45)  (-2.06)  (10.0) 
ijt RF   -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 
  (-26.3) (-1.96) (-11.3) (-5.92) (-10.2) 
ij CB   0.28 0.18 0.18 0.34 0.31 
  (11.5) (7.78) (6.36) (12.7) (12.3) 
ij CL   0.26 0.55 0.37 0.34 0.41 
  (19.1) (47.4) (24.1) (23.0) (27.3) 
ij COL   0.89 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.41
  (33.8) (32.4) (23.7) (23.9) (27.3)   19
 
TABLE 2. Trade agreements of Europe 
 
Country            Code  EEA  ECCU   EFTA   ECFTA   EA        CEFTA   MCA  EMA 
Algeria  DZ      -      -      -      -      -      -  1976  2002 
Austria   AT  1994  1995  1960*  1973      -      -      -      -   
Belgium   BE  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      - 
Bulgaria  BG      -      -  1993      -  1993  1999      -      - 
Croatia  HR      -      -  2002  2002      -  2003      -      - 
Cyprus   CY  2004  2004      -  1973      -      -      -      - 
The Czech Rep.  CZ  2004  2004  1992      -  1992  1993      -      - 
Denmark   DK  1994  1973  1960*  1973      -      -      -      - 
Egypt  EG      -      -      -      -      -      -  1977  2004 
Estonia   EE  2004  2004  1996      -  1995      -      -      - 
Finland   FI  1994  1995  1986*  1973      -      -      -      - 
France   FR  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      - 
Germany   DE  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      - 
Greece   GR  1994  1981      -  1981      -      -      -      - 
Hungary   HU  2004  2004  1993      -  1992  1993      -      - 
Iceland  IS  1994      -  1970  1973      -      -      -      - 
Ireland   IE  1994  1973  1960*  1973      -      -      -      - 
Israel  IL      -      -  1993      -      -      -      -           2000 
Italy   IT  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      - 
Jordan  JO      -      -  2002      -      -      -  1977  2002 
Latvia   LV  2004  2004  1996      -  1995      -      -      - 
Lebanon  LB      -      -      -      -      -      -  1977  2003   
Lithuania   LT  2004  2004  1996      -  1995      -      -      - 
Luxembourg   LU  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      - 
FYR Macedonia  MK      -      -  2001  2001      -      -      -      - 
Malta   MT  2004  2004      -  1971      -      -      -      -   
Morocco  MA      -      -  1999      -      -      -      -  2000 
Netherlands   NL  1994  1957      -  1957      -      -      -      -   
Norway  NO  1994      -  1960  1973      -      -      -      -   
Palestine  PS      -      -  1999      -      -      -      -  1997 
Poland   PL  2004  2004  1993      -  1992  1993      -      -   
Portugal   PT  1994  1986  1960*  1973      -      -      -      - 
Romania  RO      -      -  1993      -  1993  1997      -      -   
The Slovak Rep.  SK  2004  2004  1992      -  1992  1993      -      -   
Slovenia   SI  2004  2004  1995      -  1997  1996      -      -   
Spain   ES  1994  1986      -  1986      -      -      -      -   
Sweden   SE  1994  1995  1960*  1973      -      -      -      - 
Switzerland  CH  1994      -  1960  1973      -      -      -      -   
Syria  SY      -      -      -      -      -      -  1977      - 
Tunisia  TN      -      -      -      -      -      -      -  1998 
Turkey   TR      -  1996  1992  1963      -      -      -      - 
The UK   UK  1994  1973  1960*  1973      -      -      -      -   
 
Notes: Dates of entry into force of accession agreements into blocs for individual countries are 
shown. Countries with * later withdrew from EFTA to join ECCU.  
Data source: EU External Trade Commission. 
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      TABLE 3. Some characteristics of the European countries and their partners 
 
Country              GDP  DIST  PCGDP     K/L            average tariffs     
Belgium    260.3    720   26,960    93,304    0.33(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
Luxembourg      25.0    716  55,100     158,018   0.07(1973) – 0.00(1994)   
Netherlands    393.0    765  27,206    87,241    0.49(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
France                 1391.2    775  25,122    84,351   0.51(1973) – 0.01(1994)       
Germany             1992.0    890  25,810    90,197   0.57(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
Italy                     1145.6  1132  24,808    70,333   0.49(1973) – 0.01(1994)       
The UK               1463.5    844  24,524    58,331    1.50(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
Ireland   100.3  1194  29,940    73,432  10.68(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
Denmark    167.2  1026  28,958    86,960   1.21(1973) – 0.00(1994)       
Greece   120.9  1921  16,704    41,740   6.98(1973) – 0.05(1994)       
Spain   597.5  1400  19,864    58,748  13.42(1973) – 0.01(1994)       
Portugal   113.1  1782  17,092    38,945    8.03(1973) – 0.01(1994)        
Austria    201.3    993  27,618  101,097   4.51(1973) – 1.21(1994)         
Finland   126.1  1776   24,606    82,394   3.03(1973) – 0.97(1994)     
Sweden   239.9  1468  24,188    76,434    1.73(1973) – 0.95(1994)   
Iceland       8.2  2482  28,244    78,273  20.04(1973) – 1.28(1994) 
Norway   167.1  1373  34,900     111,427    1.22(1973) – 0.69(1994) 
Switzerland   254.8    790  28,436     118,790    7.17(1973) – 0.79(1994) 
The Czech Rep.*    58.0    880  14,186   21,616     2.79(1992) – 0.63(2001) 
The Slovak Rep.*    21.2  1031  11,578   17,904     2.79(1992) – 0.47(2001) 
Slovenia*     20.0    979  16,588   35,355     6.15(1995) – 1.07(2001) 
Hungary*     51.9  1147  12,178   16,871   10.74(1992) – 1.11(2001) 
Poland*   170.0  1229    9,786   11,636   15.50(1992) – 1.70(2001) 
Estonia*       5.5  1718  10,406   14,801     0.19(1995) – 0.04(2001) 
Latvia*       7.2  1554    7,764     7,134     1.58(1995) – 0.57(2001) 
Lithuania*     11.7  1531    8,996   12,976     1.20(1995) – 0.50(2001) 
Bulgaria     13.5      1593    6,258     7,395     4.79(1995) – 1.04(2001) 
Romania     40.1  1684    5,914     7,797     5.41(1993) – 1.89(2001) 
Cyprus*       9.3  2721  16,937   36,168     5.42(1975) – 2.32(1998) 
Malta*       3.6  1704  16,878   45,181   12.90(1972) – 1.45(1998) 
Turkey   182.3  2040    6,070     9,971   32.84(1970) – 1.56(1996) 
FYR Macedonia       3.6  1524    6,294     7,338        N.A.      – 4.56(2002) 
Croatia     20.4  1049    9,232      14,424          N.A.      – 4.75(2001) 
Egypt     91.8      3004    3,514     4,457   20.11(1977) –12.78(1997) 
Algeria     51.8      1531    5,400   12,412          N.A.      –17.88(2001) 
Israel   107.0  3048  19,512   56,489     0.83(1993) – 0.62(2000) 
Jordan       8.5      3133    3,970   10,514   13.70(1977) – 5.66(2001) 
Lebanon     16.7  2957    4,262   15,149        N.A.      –14.60(1999) 
Morocco     34.9      2075    3,580     5,112        N.A.      –13.89(1999) 
Palestine       4.1  3072    1,389        7,263        N.A.      –      N.A. 
Syria     17.9  3038    3,440     5,728   10.78(1977) –  6.23(1999) 
Tunisia     20.2  1525    6,228     9,965   8.40(1998) – 6.82(2000) 
Notes: Countries with * later joined the EU. GDP and per capita GDP are averages for 1998-2002 in 
terms of purchasing power parity. GDP is in billions of US$. Capital-labor ratios are in US$ per 
worker. 1973 and 2001 are the earliest and latest observations for average tariff rates for most 
countries.  
Data source: World Development Indicators 2004, CEPII, and the author’s own calculations. 
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FIGURE 1. Trade diversion in resource- and labor-intensive sectors 
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FIGURE 2. Overall trade diversion effects 
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Appendix A: SITC-2 codes of industries in each factor intensity sector  
 
1.  Resource-intensive 
51, 56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68 
2.   Labor-intensive 
  62, 65, 69, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89 
3.   Human capital-intensive low technology 
 55,  71 
4.   Human capital-and labor-intensive high technology  
  72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 87, 88 
5.  Human and physical capital-intensive high technology  
  52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 78 
 
 
Appendix B: Non-partner countries 
 
Angola(AO), Antigua and Barbuda(AI), Argentina(AR), Armenia(AM), Australia(AU), 
Azerbaijan(AZ), Bahamas(BS), Bahrain(BH), Bangladesh(BD), Barbados(BB), Belarus(BY), 
Belize(BZ), Benin(BJ), Bhutan(BT), Bolivia(BO), Bosnia Herzegovina(BA), Botswana(BW), 
Brazil(BR), Burkina Faso(BF), Burundi(BI), Cambodia(KH), Cameroon(CM), Canada(CA), 
Cape Verde(CV), Central African Rep.(CF), Chad(TD), Chile(CL), China(CN), Colombia(CO), 
Comoros(KM), Congo(CG), Costa Rica(CR), Cote d’Ivoire(CI), Dem. Rep. of Congo(CD), 
Djibouti(DJ), Dominica(DM), Dominican Rep.(DA), Ecuador(EC), El Salvador(SV), Equatorial 
Guinea(GQ), Eritrea(ER), Ethiopia(ET), Fiji(FJ), FS Micronesia(FM), Gabon(GA), 
Gambia(GM), Georgia(GE), Ghana(GH), Grenada(GD), Guatemala(GT), Guinea(GN), Guinea-
Bissau(GY), Guyana(GY), Haiti(HT), Honduras(HN), Hong Kong(HK), India(IN), 
Indonesia(ID), Iran(IR), Jamaica(JM), Japan(JP), Kazakhstan(KZ), Kenya(KE), Korea(KR), 
Kuwait(KW), Kyrgyzstan(KG), Lao People’s Dem. Rep(LA)., Lesotho(LS), Libya(LY), 
Macao(MO), Madagascar(MG), Malawi(MW), Malaysia(MY), Maldives(MV), Mali(ML), 
Mauritania(MR), Mauritius(MU), Mexico(MX), Moldova(MD), Mongolia(MN), 
Mozambique(MZ), Namibia(NA), Nepal(NP), New Zealand(NZ), Nicaragua(NI), Niger(NE), 
Nigeria(N), Oman(OM), Pakistan(PK), Panama(PA), Papua New Guinea(PG), Paraguay(PY), 
Peru(PE), Philippines(PH), Russian Fed.(RU), Rwanda(RW), Saint Lucia(LC), Sao Tome and 
Principe(ST), Saudi Arabia(SA), Senegal(SN), Seychelles(SC), Sierra Leone(SL), 
Singapore(SG), South Africa(ZA), Solomon Islands(SB), Somalia(SO), Sri Lanka(LK), 
Sudan(SD), Suriname(SR), Swaziland(SZ), Tajikistan(TJ), Tanzania(TZ), Thailand(TH), 
Togo(TG), Tonga(TO), Trinidad and Tobago(TT), Uganda(UG), Ukraine(UA), United Arab 
Emirates(AE), Uruguay(UY), USA(US), Uzbekistan(UZ), Vanuatu(VU), Venezuela(VE), 
Vietnam(VN), Yemen(YE), Zambia(ZM), and Zimbabwe(ZW).    
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1 This variable was omitted in both Egger (2000) and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), arguing that 
its effects were captured by the time-invariant bilateral interaction fixed effect. 
2 Also, in labor-intensive sectors, exporter’s GDP, and in human capital intensive sectors the 
similarity variable take the incorrect signs.  
3 The objective of the EMA is also to gradually liberalize trade in agriculture. However, all it 
does in concrete terms is to largely lock in the status quo. Negotiations to improve on existing 
agricultural concessions are to be initiated after 2000.  
4 The EU also has some preferential non-reciprocal trade agreements with their former colonies 
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific under Lome/Cotonou Agreements.  These countries’ 
export performance in the EU market has been disappointing. Therefore, the EU proposed free 
trade agreements in place of the non-reciprocal access these countries enjoyed before just like the 
EMAs. 
5 Note that accession to the EU implies participation in the EEA, and the ECCU.  
6 Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007. The EU is expected to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey in 2005.  
7 These are the six original EU countries.  
8 Part of the reason could be that amount of trade in Sectors 1-2 is more than the trade in human 
capital-intensive sectors.  
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